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THE DAVIS DILEMMA. How TO PREVENT BATTLES OVER FROZEN
PREEMBRYOS1
Cryopreservation of preembryos, or the freezing of fertil-
ized human eggs, is a procedure increasingly used by infertile
couples to improve the odds of success of advanced reproduc-
tive technologies. As a consequence, divorcing couples are find-
ing themselves in dispute over the disposition of frozen preem-
bryos that have not been implanted. Courts have been called on
to decide to whom the frozen preembryos should be awarded,
but the law is unclear whether frozen preembryos should be
treated as marital property, as children, or as something else.
The author analyzes various arguments concerning the appro-
priate legal status of frozen preembryos, and suggests a new
rule to settle such disputes.
INTRODUCTION
THE LAST DECADE has witnessed tremendous growth in the
field of in vitro fertilization ("IVF").2 IVF has inspired great
joy in its proponents and beneficiaries, and great fear in its critics.
Supporters of IVF point to the 15,000 children born through the
miracle of IVF,3 while critics note the unresolved legal and ethical
dilemmas posed by this technology I
IVF has generated legal problems stemming from disputes
over control and ownership of preembryos. These disputes fall into
two categories: disputes between IVF participants and their
climc, 5 and disputes between the IVF participants themselves.,
1. For the purposes of this note, it is helpful to distinguish between different stages of
embryonic development. A "preembryo" refers to a zygote, or fertilized egg, not yet im-
planted in the uterus. Implantation normally takes place approximately 10-14 days after
conception. See infra notes 27-37 & 116-20 and accompanying text.
2. In vitro fertilization is a reproductive technology involving the extracorporeal fer-
tilization of a human egg. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL L. REv. 939, 942 (1986).
3. See Smothers, Embryos in a Divorce Case: Joint Property or Offspring? N.Y
Times, Apr. 22, 1989, at 1, col. 5 (5,500 of these children were born in the United States).
4. See, e.g., Suro, Vatican Asks Governments to Curb Birth Technology and to Out-
law Surrogates, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (Vatican condemns IVF due to
the likelihood of unforeseeable and damaging consequences to society).
5. See, e.g., York v. Jones Institute, 7L7 F Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (hospital
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This note focuses on disputes between spouses who, after par-
ticipating in an IVF program, no longer agree on the disposition
of their preembryos. This type of dispute is occurring with in-
creasing frequency7 and has recently received a great deal of me-
dia attention.8 Davis v Davis,9 decided in September 1990, illus-
trates the controversy that can arise when an infertile couple
begins the IVF process with the hope of having a child but then
decides to divorce. Cases like Davis challenge courts and legisla-
tures to develop a principled approach to balancing the spouses'
conflicting interests.
This note examines the issues involved in adjudicating dis-
putes in which one spouse favors implantation and the other ob-
jects. It focuses on the facts of the Davis case as they existed at
the time the case was presented to the trial court, when the wife
sought implantation over her husband's objection.' 0 This note will
also address the questions that would be posed if the Davis facts
refused to release couple's preembryos for transfer to another hospital); Del Zio v. Presby-
terian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 14, 1978) (suit against hospi-
tal for abandoning then-experimental IVF technology and destroying couple's preembryos).
In Australia a law was enacted specifically to determine the fate of preembryos upon the
death of their genetic parents, Mario and Elsa Rios, in a plane crash. The law permitted
adoption of these preembryos and provided that any of the preembryos brought to term
would have no rights in the Rios estate. See Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and
Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1081 n.18 (1986).
6. For simplicity, this note refers to IVF participants as spouses or as husband and
wife. Although there is no biological reason for IVF participants to be married, virtually all
couples seeking IVF treatment are spouses. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, IVF participants need not remain married to each other after they have cre-
ated preembryos. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641
(Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), revd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990) (husband and wife divorced, leaving disposition of seven frozen preembryos in
dispute).
7. See Smothers, supra note 3, at 8, col. 5 (legal expert Lori Andrews notes that
doctors have reported disputes between IVF participants over the disposition of preembryos
arising in various states).
8. See, e.g., Findlay, Gregg, Impoco, Lief, Gest, Work, Taylor, Allman, Burroughs
& Viney, The Trial of an Embryonic Issue, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 21, 1989, at
13; Sanders, Whose Lives Are These?, TIME, Oct. 2, 1989, at 19.
9. No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), revd, No.
180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
10. Once the Davis case reached the appellate level, Mary Sue Davis no longer
sought implantation. Instead, she argued for the right to have the preembryos donated to
another infertile couple. No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at I n.1. In a bizarre twist,
Junior Davis has recently married a woman who is incapable of having children and has
indicated an interest in hiring a surrogate mother and having at least one of the frozen
embryos implanted. See Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1990, at 36, 36 (the Davises have "revised, if not reversed, their original positions.").
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were reversed and the husband favored implantation against the
wife's wishes.
Part I of this note explains the need for IVF and describes
the IVF process."' Part I also discusses the facts and arguments
presented in the Davis case. 2 Part II analyzes the preembryo's
legal status, presenting alternative arguments that the preembryo
should be characterized as property, human life, or as something
else.13 Part III examines the procreative rights and interests of the
spouses. It outlines the constitutional arguments available to each
spouse 14 and evaluates two possible approaches to resolving
spousal disputes over frozen preembryos. 15 Part III also explains
how the choice of legal status accorded the preembryo affects the
validity of the approach chosen to resolve the dispute.1 6
This note concludes that preembryos are neither property nor
human life, but instead possess a unique status 'deserving special
respect. 17 For this reason, the outcome of a dispute between
spouses over their preembryos should be governed neither by prop-
erty law nor by granting preembryos legal rights. Instead, the out-
come should respect the special status of the preembryo in a man-
ner that maximizes fairness and minimizes harm to each spouse's
interests. The most appropriate outcome is to allow the spouse
favoring implantation to prevail, on condition of that spouse's ac-
ceptance of sole legal responsibility for any resulting child.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Infertility
Since the 1978 birth in England of Louise Brown, the first
child conceived through the extracorporeal fertilization of a
human egg,18 IVF has spread rapidly throughout the United
States, Canada, Europe, and Australia. 9 To date there are more
than 220 IVF programs in the United States alone.20
11. See infra text accompanying notes 18-46.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 47-80.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 81-173.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 174-208.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 209-23.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 224-29.
17. See infra pp. 578-79.
18. Robertson, supra note 2, at 942-43.
19. Id. at 943.
20. Consumer Protection Issues Involving In Vitro Fertilization Clinics: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy of the House
5451991]
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Efforts to expand IVF largely result from the growing num-
ber of infertile couples who are desperate to conceive. 21 This in-
crease in infertility over the last several years can be attributed to
numerous factors, including changes in sexual behavior and the
increasing age at which women marry and have children.2 A re-
cent report by the American Fertility Society shows that 2.4 mil-
lion American couples fail to achieve pregnancy within the first
year of trying.23 These couples often find the inability to bear chil-
dren to be a great and powerful loss, causing "isolation, guilt,
marital strife, and intense assaults on feelings of self-worth." '24
Until the recent rise in recognition and treatment of infertil-
ity, this non-life-threatening and supposedly incurable problem re-
ceived little attention,25 leaving those afflicted to suffer in silence.
It was no wonder that when the first IVF center in the United
States opened in 1981, 3,000 people signed up immediately, de-
spite a reported success rate of only two percent.26
B. The IVF Process
In vitro fertilization is a procedure used primarily to treat
women with tubal disease and men with a low sperm count. 2 The
IVF process duplicates in a laboratory the fertilization and devel-
opment of a preembryo within the fallopian tube.28 The first step
Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter In Vitro Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Ron Wyden, subcommittee chairman).
21. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 945 ("[I]nfertility is now appearing with greater
frequency among large numbers of white, educated, middle and upper income women in
their twenties and thirties."); see also A. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILD-
ING POLIcY FROM LABORATORIES To LEGISLATURES 23-24 (1989) (discussing the advan-
tages of IVF over other alternatives available to infertile couples).
22. Robertson, supra note 2, at 945.
23. AM. FERTILITY SOC'Y, INFERTILITY: AN OVERVIEw 3 (1988), reprinted in In Vi-
tro Hearings, supra note 20, at 76.
24. Robertson, supra note 2, at 945. Robertson continues:
The inability to beget, bear, and rear children is a great loss for many infertile
men and women. Infertility often implicates the most fundamental feelings
about self and one's relation to the natural order, and may leave persons feeling
handicapped or defective in an area central to personal identity and fulfillment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
25. See A. BONNICKSEN, supra note 21, at 19 (attributing the past lack of attention
to infertility problems to modern medicine's emphasis on finding permanent cures for dis-
ease instead of pursuing ongoing circumvention- of a chronic condition).
26. Id. at 24.
27. See Dickey, The Medical Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REv. 317, 318-19
(1986) (discussing causes of infertility and candidacy for IVF programs).
28. Id. at 324.
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of IVF involves stimulating the release of multiple eggs from the
ovaries of a pre-menopausal woman through fertility medications;
harvesting several eggs at once increases the likelihood that only
one surgical procedure for egg removal will be required. 9 The
next step involves removal of the eggs by either laparoscopy or
ultrasound-directed needle aspiration.30 Once retrieved, the eggs
are placed "into a fluid similar to that found in the fallopian
tube."31 The timing of this removal is very important "because an
egg will not develop properly if it is collected too early "32
Following the egg's maturation in the fluid, sperm cells previ-
ously collected from the husband are introduced to it.33 One
sperm cell will fertilize the egg to form a zygote, which will then
develop by cell division until reaching a stage between two and
eight cells.3 Because implantation has not occurred and advanced
cell differentiation has not yet begun, this developing multicellular
entity may at this stage be termed a "preembryo." 35 When the
developing preembryo reaches the four- or eight-cell stage, it is
normally implanted in the woman's uterus by a cervical cathe-
ter.3 6 The hope is that in approximately one week, the preembryo
will attach to the uterine wall, continue to grow, and develop into
a fetus.37
Because most cases require several attempts at implantation
to achieve a successful pregnancy, the technique of cryopreserva-
tion, or freezing and storing of newly fertilized eggs, has become
an integral part of many IVF programs. 38 Cryopreservation is
29. Id.
30. Id. at 326. Laparoscopy requires administration of a mild general anesthetic,
while ultrasound-directed needle aspiration is performed under a local anesthetic. R.
MARRS IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO REPLACEMENT 6 (1989), reprinted in In
Vitro Hearings, supra note 20, at 99. Some physicians claim, however, that this latter
method may not produce as many eggs. Dickey, supra note 27, at 326.
31. Dickey, supra note 27, at 326.
32. McCartan, A Survey of the Legal, Ethical, and Public Policy Considerations of
In Vitro Fertilization, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS, & PUB. POL. 695, 696 (1986).
33. Dickey, supra note 27, at 326.
34. Id.
35. A preembryo, as distinguished from an embryo, is a fertilized egg that has not
yet implanted itself into the uterine wall. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), revd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642
(Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (summarizing expert testimony offered at trial). For a complete
discussion of the validity of this distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 114-29.
36. Dickey, supra note 27, at 326.
37. See generally McCartan, supra note 32, at 697 (describing the implantation pro-
cess and the subsequent development of the embryo within the uterus).
38. Sillman, In Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation, 67 MICH. B.J. 601 (1988).
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beneficial3 9 because it allows a woman to undergo multiple im-
plantations without having to endure several surgical procedures
to extract eggs.40 Cryopreservation thus reduces the overall cost of
IVF,41 raises the rate of pregnancy, 42 and enables a woman to re-
ceive the preembryos for implantation when she is physically and
emotionally best prepared.43 Fertilized eggs have been frozen for
up to twenty-eight months and then implanted successfully, result-
ing in -live births.44 It is estimated that as of 1988, at least sixty
children worldwide were born from frozen preembryos.45
The major disadvantage of cryopreservation lies in the un-
foreseen circumstances that may arise after the preembryos have
been cryopreserved, but before they have been implanted. Death,
divorce, separation, a change of heart, or a natural pregnancy
may make future implantation impossible or undesirable for one
or both spouses. Many IVF clinics require participants to sign
consent forms at the outset that stipulate what to do with the
preembryos should any of these events occur.46 In cases where
forms were not signed or were not sufficiently explicit, however,
disagreements over the disposition of the preembryos have led to
legal battles.
39. But cf. Bonnicksen, Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in the Clinical Setting,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1988, at 26, 26-27 (noting that the benefits of cryopreserva-
tion have not yet been sufficiently proven and that potential emotional repercussions, in-
cluding abnormal emotional bonding to the frozen preembryos, may actually cause harm to
IVF participants).
40. Id. at 26. This is of even greater benefit to women who anticipate loss of or
damage to their ovaries, or who may be unable to undergo more than one laparoscopy.
Note, supra note 5, at 1084.
41. Id. (avoiding repeated start-up costs as well as decreasing time lost from work
provides financial savings).
42. The chances for pregnancy increase because the embryo can be implanted after
the woman is completely free from the effects of the hormonal stimulation and anesthesia
used during laparoscopy. Sillman, supra note 38, at 602; Note, supra note 5, at 1084.
43. See Sillman, supra note 38, at 601 (cryogenically preserved fertilized eggs can
be saved for later implantation if a woman is presently ill, incapacitated, or otherwise
unavailable).
44. Sherman, Just Whose Embryo Is It, Anyway? Couple Suing to 'Rescue its Ge-
netic Material, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
45. Bonnicksen, supra note 39, at 26.
46. Curriden, Frozen Embryos: The New Frontier, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 68, 71;
see Goodman, The Fate of Biological Mergers, Boston Globe, Mar. 9, 1989, at 15, col. 5
(suggesting that frozen embryo disposition agreements include "pre-conceptual clauses"
that specify whether the husband or wife controls the fate of the preembryos in case of
disagreement).
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C. The Davis Controversy
The most publicized case involving a dispute between spouses
over frozen preembryos is Davis v DavIs.417 The Davis controversy
arose when Junior and Mary Sue Davis,48 longtime IVF partici-
pants, decided to divorce. Before that time, Mary Sue Davis had
"suffered significant trauma and pain" in her attempts to bear a
child through natural means.49 After five ectopic pregnancies, 50
one of her fallopian tubes ruptured, nearly causing her death.5 1 To
avoid future problems, Mary Sue Davis "undertook surgical treat-
ment which rendered her incapable of natural conception. '52
Despite this setback, the Davises decided to pursue alterna-
tive means of beginning a family They first attempted six preem-
bryo implantations through separate IVF procedures." After all
six procedures failed, the Davises attempted to adopt a child; this
effort was also unsuccessful. 4 Finally, in 1988, the Davises heard
about cryopreservation and Mary Sue Davis underwent another
IVF procedure. Two preembryos were implanted unsuccessfully
and seven more were frozen for later implantation.55 These seven
frozen preembryos, stored at the Fertility Center of East Tennes-
see in Knoxville,56 became the subject of controversy between the
Davises.
In 1989, following Mary Sue and Junior Davis's decision to
divorce, each spouse fought for the right to control the fate of the
frozen preembryos. Mary Sue Davis believed that the preembryos
represented her best, and possibly last, chance to bear a child. She
asserted the right to have them implanted, regardless of whether
the court viewed the preembryos as property or human life. If the
47. No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989),
rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
48. Mary Sue Davis has since remarried and changed her name to Mary Sue Stowe.
Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at 1. For the sake of clarity and consistency,
however, this note refers to her as Mary Sue Davis.
49. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 4.
50. In an ectopic pregnancy, gestation occurs in the fallopian tube or peritoneal cav-
ity instead of in the uterus. WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 395 (1984).
51. Curriden, supra note 46, at 68.
52. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 4. Specifically, Mary Sue
Davis's remaining fallopian tube was ligated. Curriden, supra note 46, at 68.
53. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 5. The couple spent nearly
$50,000 on these unsuccessful implantation attempts. Curriden, supra note 46, at 68.
54. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 5.
55. Id. at 7-8.
56. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at 1.
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court viewed the preembryos as property, the outcome of the case
would depend on the application of the state's equitable distribu-
tion of property statute.57 Having undergone far more physical
pain than her husband in creating the preembryos, Mary Sue Da-
vis contributed more to their "acquisition" and therefore had a
greater equitable interest in the "property "58 If the court instead
viewed the preembryos as human life, the outcome of the case
would depend on the best interests of the "child," as required by
the state's custody statute.59 Since the interests of the "children"
would be best served by allowing them to come into existence, im-
plantation would be warranted. 60
Mary Sue Davis also asserted a constitutionally protected
"'right to generate a child,' "61 whether the child was conceived
naturally or artificially 62 She maintained that Junior Davis's con-
stitutional right not to procreate was waived as of the time he
consented to fertilization and to at least one implantation.63
Junior Davis was vehemently opposed to implantation of the
preembryos. His preference was to have them remain in their fro-
zen state, which was, in effect, a request for their destruction.6
4
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (Supp. 1989). The statute reads in pertinent part:
"In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider all relevant fac-
tors including: (5) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
appreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate prope'ty " Id.
58. See Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff's Brief at 14, Davis, No. E-14496, 1989
Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev d, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS
642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Defendant's Brief] (arguing that the woman's
contribution, as measured by physical pain, is normally much greater).
59. The statute reads in pertinent part:
In a suit for divorce where the custody of a minor child or minor
children is a question, the court may award the care, custody, and control
of such child or children to [either, both, or neither parents] as the welfare and
interest of the child or children may demand
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (Supp. 1989).
60. See generally Defendant's Supplemental Brief at I, Davis, No. E-14496, 1989
Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (stating that the
Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989), supports a finding that human life begins at conception and therefore tips the
scales in favor of applying § 36-6-101 in this case).
61. Defendants' Brief, supra note 58, at 9 (quoting Krental, "Ownership" of the
Fertilized Ovum in Vitro: A Hypothetical Case in Louisiana, 32 LA. B.J. 284, 286 (1985)).
62. Id. at 10. For authority supporting a constitutional right to reproduction by arti-
ficial means, see infra text accompanying notes 177-82.
63. See Defendant's Brief, supra note 58, at 14-15 ("[T]here have been no laws
implemented since Adam and Eve or in recorded history that have given the man the legal
or moral right to withdraw his consent once he has fertilized his mate.").
64. "[T]he undisputed, uncontroverted testimony is that to allow the parties [sic]
seven cryogentically [sic] preserved human embryos to remain so preserved for a period
[Vol. 41:543
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Junior Davis did not respond to his wife's argument that if the
preembryos were property, it would be more equitable to dis-
tribute them to her. 5 Instead, he focused on the issue of whether
the preembryos were persons, arguing that preembryos are not
persons, do not possess any independent legal rights, and should
not be defined as children or made subject to custody law 66 As to
constitutionally protected rights concerning procreation, Junior
Davis argued that the court must recognize the rights of both
spouses to control their reproductive processes.8 7 Finding in favor
of Mary Sue Davis would remove this control, forcing Junior Da-
vis to father a child against his will. Ruling in Junior Davis's
favor, however, would merely require Mary Sue to have a child by
other means.6 8
At the trial level, Judge Dale Young awarded temporary cus-
tody of the seven preembryos to Mary Sue Davis for the purpose
of implantation.69 This award was based on his finding that
human life begins at conception, and that the best interests of the
"child or children in vitro" would be served by allowing their im-
plantation.7" Judge Young relied heavily on the expert opinion of
Dr. Jerome Lejeune, who testified that "a man is a man; that
upon fertilization, the entire constitution of the man is clearly, un-
equivocally spelled-out, including arms, legs, nervous systems and
the like; that upon inspection via DNA manipulation, one can see
the life codes for each of these otherwise unobservable elements of
the unique individual."7 1 The court concluded that the Davises
had already accomplished their original intent to produce chil-
dren, 2 and implantation would afford the only hope for their
exceeding two years is tantamount to [their] destruction "Davis, No. E-14496, 1989
Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 36; see Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early
Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437, 467 n.75 (1990) ("indefinite storage becomes a euphemism
for nontransfer or discard").
65. See generally Plaintiff's Brief, Davis, No. E-14496, Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir.
Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990) (discussing only the issue of whether preembryos are persons and not how to dis-
tribute them if classified as property).
66. Id. at 1.
67. d. at 3.
68. Id. at 5 (quoting a draft version of Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen
Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov./Dec. 1989, at 7).
69. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 27.
72. Id. at 30.
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survival.78
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed and
remanded. 4 The appellate court held that neither Tennessee law
nor the United States Constitution, under Roe v Wade, 5 grants
fetuses the legal status of persons.78 Rather, the Tennessee statu-
tory scheme "indicates that as embryos develop, they are accorded
more respect than mere human cells because of their burgeoning
potential for life."77 The court also held that Junior Davis has a
"constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no
pregnancy has taken place." 78 The court stated, "it would be re-
pugnant and offensive to constitutional principles to order Mary
Sue to implant these fertilized ova against her will. It would be
equally repugnant to order Junior to bear the psychological, if not
the legal, consequences of paternity against his will."'7 9 To resolve
the dispute, the court granted Mary Sue and Junior Davis a joint
interest in the preembryos, with equal control over their
disposition.80
The result reached by the Davis appellate court is trouble-
some for two reasons. First, the court's grant to each spouse of
"equal control" over the preembryos has little meaning in light of
its recognition of each spouse's constitutional right not to have the
preembryos implanted. In effect, the spouse opposing implantation
exercises determinative control over the preembryos. Second, the
court's ruling delegates the decision to the spouses, who would not
be in court but for their inability to resolve the issue jointly
It is possible to formulate a better rule, one that is fair to
both spouses yet less disappointing to the spouse who loses the
dispute. To better resolve the type of controversy presented in Da-
vis, two central issues must be addressed: the legal status of the
preembryo and the spouse's reproductive rights in this context.
These issues are examined below
73. Id. at 37.
74. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at 8-9.
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at 7.
77. Id. at 8 (observing that Tennessee statutes incorporate the trimester approach to
identifying viable human life as outlined in Roe).
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id.
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II. THE STATUS OF THE PREEMBRYO
Scholars in the field of medical ethics have advocated three
distinct positions with regard to the preembryo's legal status.
Some categorize preembryos as property and argue that, in a di-
vorce proceeding, preembryos should be subject to state laws gov-
erning the equitable distribution of marital property "I Others be-
lieve that life begins at the moment of conception and that, as
human life, preembryos must be implanted as a matter of consti-
tutional right.82 A third group accords the preembryo a unique
status as potential life, deserving of special care and respect but
no legal protection. 3 Under this last theory, other considerations
may govern the decision whether to implant or destroy
preembryos.
A. The Preembryo as Property
Some groups and commentators advocate classification of
preembryos as property 84 For instance, the American Fertility
Society ("AFS") has published an ethical statement that "ga-
metes and concepti [preembryos] are the property of the do-
nors,"85 and "the donors therefore have the right to decide at their
sole discretion the disposition of these items."88
In making this statement, the AFS seemed to recognize the
interest of IVF participants in controlling the usage of their ge-
netic material. This interest is analogous to that which a patient
may have in the disposition of removed organs. Examination of
such a case will illuminate the contention that preembryos should
be given the status of property
In Moore v Regents of University of California,7 the plain-
tiff had his diseased spleen removed as part of his treatment for
leukemia. Following this procedure, the plaintiff's doctor discov-
81. See infra text accompanying notes 84-100.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 101-49.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 150-173.
84. See, e.g., Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 357, 366
n.47 (1986) (citing Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1986,
at 28; Jansen, Sperm and Ova as Property, I 1 J. MED. ETHICS 123 (1985)) (giving exam-
pies of groups and individuals who hold such views).
85. American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FER-
TILITY & STERILITY 12 (1984).
86. Id.
87. 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988), rev'd, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793
P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
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ered that the removed spleen contained unique cells. The doctor
modified the spleen cells through genetic engineering to create val-
uable pharmaceutical products, without the plaintiff's knowledge
or consent. When the plaintiff discovered his doctor's actions, he
sued the doctor for conversion of personal property 11
The California appellate court in Moore agreed with the
plaintiff that the interest in one's own genetic material or body
parts is sufficient to be considered a property interest.89 The appel-
late court held that there is no legal authority, public policy, or
biological fact that compels a contrary result.9"
The California Supreme Court, however, held that property
law is not the appropriate means of assessing a person's interest in
excised cells or other biological parts. 91 The court maintained that
"one may earnestly wish to protect privacy and dignity [by con-
trolling one's body and body parts] without accepting the ex-
tremely problematic conclusion that interference with those inter-
ests amounts to a conversion of personal property "92
The Moore court's finding that individuals have no property
rights in their biological parts applies a fortiori to individuals
claiming property rights in preembryos produced from their ge-
netic material. While the spleen cells in Moore merely became
pharmaceutical products, preembryos have the potential to be-
come viable fetuses and newborn infants. Because of their poten-
tial to become human beings, preembryos have a status that
should under no circumstances be considered property
This view is consistent with the post-slavery policy in the
United States against recognizing property interests in human be-
ings.93 While the law has recognized parents' rights to control
their children,94 it no longer goes so far as to call offspring the
88. Id. at 715, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
89. Id. at 723-25, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 503-05 (noting that the statutory listing of per-
sonal property items is not exhaustive and that plaintiff demonstrated sufficient use, con-
trol, and disposition over his spleen cells to classify them as personal property).
90. Id. at 723, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
91. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 138, 793 P.2d 479, 489, 271
Cal. Rptr. 146, 157 (1990).
92. Id. at 140, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
93. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1; see also Dickens, The Ectogenetic Human
Being: A Problem Child of Our Time, 18 W ONT. L. REV. 241, 245 (1980) ("At no point
on the evolutionary progression do property interests clearly attach to human persons under
modern, post-slavery law."); cf. Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U.
TORONTO L.J. 142 (1977) (discussing property rights in body parts and materials taken
from the body of a living person).
94. See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 642, 334 P.2d 1011, 1015
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property of their parents.9 5
Finally, the position against treating preembryos as property
has been accepted by experts worldwide a as well as by politi-
cians97 and juries 8 in the United States. It was also adopted by
prestigious bioethics committees in England and Australia.9
While it may be proper to grant IVF participants decision-
making power over the future of the preembryos they create, this
right should not be mistaken for a property interest. Such a right
should be considered exactly what it is: control over decisions re-
garding a potential life emanating from one's genetic material. To
call it property "'comes up to the threshold of assaulting the
value of a potential person.' "100
B. The Preembryo as Human Being
Several well-known groups support the position that preem-
bryos should be granted the rights and protections accorded to
persons under the law because life begins at conception. This view
is held by the Roman Catholic Church and by members of "right-
(1959) ("The parent has authority to control the child, and to administer restraint and
punishment, in order to compel obedience to reasonable and necessary directions.").
95. See generally M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 234-42 (1985) (discussing the gradual shift in child
custody law from a property-based standard, automatically giving the male custody, to a
"best interests of the child" standard).
96. See, e.g., G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 130 (1986).
97. See, e.g., Defendant's Brief, supra note 58, at 14 (quoting Human Embryo
Transfer: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 232 (1984) (statement of Senator
Albert Gore, Jr.) ("I disagree that there's just a sliding scale of continuum with property
at one point along the spectrum and human beings at another. I think that there's a sharp
distinction between something that is property and something that is not property.")).
98. See, e.g., Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ.. 3588, slip op. at 6
(S.D.N.Y Nov. 14, 1978) (jury found that defendants did not convert property when they
destroyed a test tube containing ova and sperm for in vitro fertilization).
99. See Andrews, supra note 84, at 366-67. The Warnock Committee in England
proposed legislation that would "'ensure there is no right of ownership in a human em-
bryo."' Id. (quoting M. WARNOCK. A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON
HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY para. I0.I1 (1985)). Likewise, the Waller
Committee in Victoria, Australia, stated that it "does not regard the couple whose embryo
is stored as owning or having dominion over the embryo." Id. at 367 (quoting COMMITTEE
TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILI-
ZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY IN VITRO FERTILIZA-
TION § 2.8 (1984) (statement of Louis Waller, chairman)).
100. Curriden, supra note 46, at 70 (quoting Dr. John Fletcher, professor of medical
ethics at the University of Virginia School of Medicine).
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to-life" groups. 10 1 It also has been adopted by a few state legisla-
tures. For example, under Louisiana law, preembryos are juridical
persons that cannot be destroyed or owned. 02 Louisiana law may
even mandate donation of preembryos to other couples if donation
would be in the preembryos' best interests.' 0 3 The constitutionality
of this law has not yet been considered by any court. 4
Missouri has also enacted a law stating that "[t]he life of
each human being begins at conception,"' 05 and that "[u]nborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-be-
ing."'' 0 In the highly publicized case of Webster v Reproductive
Health Services,' which arose from a challenge to the Missouri
abortion laws, the Court declined to pass on the constitutionality
of this language, finding that the wording did not itself regulate
abortions.'08 Unlike Louisiana or Missouri, however, Tennessee
had no statute declaring the point at which life begins. The courts
deciding the Davis case were left to decide whether a preembryo
should be given the status of human being.
1. The Davis Trial Court Approach
At the trial level in Davis v Davis, 0 9 Judge Young aligned
Tennessee with Louisiana and Missouri, holding that preembryos
are human beings."10 The court's ruling was based on its resolu-
tion of three relevant issues in the case.
First, the court took the position that the 1986 guidelines for
IVF established by the Ethics Committee of the American Fertil-
ity Society were not binding upon the court."' This finding was
necessary to the Davis holding because the AFS has maintained
101. Robertson, supra note 2, at 971; Note, supra note 5, at 1090.
102. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:126, 9:129, 9:130 (West Supp. 1989) (setting
forth details of ownership, destruction, and legal status of fertilized ova produced by IVF).
103. See id. §§ 9:125, 9:130, 9:131 (setting forth regulations for status of preem-
bryos and conditions for donation).
104. Defendant's Brief, supra note 58, at 7.
105. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (1986).
106. Id. § 1.205.1(2).
107. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
108. Id. at 3050.
109. No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev d, No.
180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990). For a discussion of the facts
and the parties' arguments involved in Davis, see supra text accompanying notes 47-80.
110. See id. at 2 (finding that "[h]uman life begins at conception" and therefore
"Mr. and Mrs. Davis have produced [seven] human beings").
111. Id. at 1.
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that preembryos are not legal persons."' Judge Young held that
while the guidelines published by the AFS set the standard for
professionals in the field of fertility treatment, they do not have
the "force and effect of the law" and may be accepted or rejected
at the court's discretion."'I
Second, the Davis trial court found that no distinction exists
between a preembryo and an embryo." 4 The court maintained
this position despite extensive expert testimony of the distinction's
validity n5 Three of the four IVF experts who testified agreed that
a preembryo is the entity that exists after an egg is fertilized but
before it naturally implants in the uterine wall and begins to de-
velop organs, body parts, and differentiated cells."' In a natural
pregnancy, this preembryonic stage lasts up" to approximately
fourteen days after fertilization; upon implantation, an embryo be-
gins to take form." 7
In disagreeing with three of the four experts, the court also
disagreed with the view of the American Fertility Society The
AFS adopts the view that a preembryo is distinct from an em-
bryo.11 The AFS explains that the preembryonic stage involves
the development of the embryo's trophoblast, or feeding layer,
rather than development of the embryo itself. The feeding layer
must be formed before the embryo can develop." 9 Prior to im-
plantation in the uterus, the preembryo is so undeveloped that
twinning may still occur.' 2 °
112. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considera-
tions of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 30S (Supp. I
1986) ("the law does not recognize the preembryo itself as a legal subject").
113. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 20.
114. Id. at 1.
115. See id. at 13-14 (synopsis of the testimony given by expert witnesses Dr. Irving
R. King, Dr. Charles A. Shivers, and Professor John A. Robertson).
116. Id.
117. Id. See generally Robertson, supra note 64, at 441-44 (discussing the biological
status of early embryos and stating that the embryonic axis, from which the major organs
and structures differentiate, does not form until the second postfertilization week).
118. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 112, at
27S ("[T]he status of the preembryo should be different from that of the still later
embryonic stages.")
119. See id. ("[E]arly events in mammalian development, very likely including the
human, involve formation of extraembryonic, rather than embryonic, structures and func-
tions."); Robertson, supra note 64, at 442 ("The outer cells develop into a trophoblastic or
feeding layer that becomes the extra-embryonic placenta, rather than the embryo
proper.").
120. See Robertson, supra note 64, at 445 n.28 ("[U]ntil implantation and the for-
mation of the embryonic axis occurs, it is not yet certain that a biological individual exists,
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Supporters of this definitional distinction maintain that
preembryos are biologically far too primitive to deserve the legal
status of personhood.' 2' While preembryos may deserve moral rec-
ognition for their potential to become persons, there is no reason
to accord them the rights of a born human being.' 22 Because
transfer or cryopreservation of fertilized eggs takes place during
the preembryonic stage,1 23 advocates of the preembryo-embryo
distinction maintain that there is no imperative for implantation
in the woman based on a legal right to life.124
Despite the substantial testimony in support of this view,
Judge Young took the position that there is no basis for a distinc-
tion between embryos and preembryos. s' 5 The court stated that it
could not find reference to the term "preembryo" in any encyclo-
pedia or dictionary, and that the term had arisen primarily be-
cause the AFS chose it "to avoid confusion for the purposes of its
own guidelines."' 26 In taking this view, the judge accepted the ex-
pert testimony of Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a genetics specialist. 127 Dr.
Lejeune testified that there is no need to classify preembryos sepa-
rately because nothing exists before the embryo except an egg and
a sperm.' 28 In support of his opinion, Dr Lejeune cited the defini-
tion of embryo from a fifty-year-old dictionary- "that youngest
form of a being.' ' 29 The court's rejection of the preembryo-em-
bryo distinction removed what it considered an artificial barrier to
finding that a cryopreserved fertilized egg is human life.
The third basis for the court's decision was its finding that
as natural twinning that produces two individuals may occur." (citing Jones & Schra-
der, And Just What Is a Pre-Embryo?, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 189, 190 (1989))).
121. See, e.g., id. at 445 ("[T]he fertilized egg and early embryo consist of undiffer-
entiated cells [and] cannot seriously be considered a person or even a rights-bearing
entity." (footnote omitted)).
122. See, e.g., Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 112,
at 30S. See generally Robertson, supra note 2, at 974 (discussing the various views on the
moral and legal status of extracorporeal preembryos).
123. See Robertson, supra note 64, at 443 ("In IVF programs the embryo will be
transferred to a uterus when it reaches the four-, six-, or eight-cell stage, some forty-eight
to seventy-two hours after conception. It is also at this stage that the embryo would be
cryopreserved for later use " (footnote omitted)).
124. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 967 (arguing that noncoital reproduction
should be left to the discretion of the patients and their doctors, without public sector
interference).
125. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at 1.
126. Id. at 20-21.
127. Id. at 27. For the court's summary of Dr. Lejeune's testimony, see id. at 76-84.
128. Id. at 79.
129. Id.
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the cells comprising cryopreserved fertilized eggs are "unique in
character and specialized to the highest degree of distinction."1 30
Here the court again relied upon Dr. Lejeune's testimony Dr.
Lejeune offered scientific evidence to prove human cell uniqueness
at the earliest stages of development 31 and testified that "it is
now an experimentally-demonstrated fact that at the three-cell
stage, every individual is uniquely different from any other indi-
vidual and the probability that the genetic information found in
one cell would be identical to another person is less than one in
one billion."1 32
On the basis of these positions - that the AFS guidelines
were not binding upon the court, that an embryo is created at the
moment an egg is fertilized, and that each embryo is genetically
unique from all others - the Davis court concluded that human
beings are created at the moment of conception.' 33 The court went
so far as to call these frozen fertilized eggs "children, in vitro"' 34
and ruled that, as such, their future should be determined by the
"best interest of the children" standard. 35 The court subsequently
concluded that implantation would be in the "children's" best
interest. 3 1
2. Where the Trial Court Went Wrong
The most significant misconception of the trial-level Davis de-
cision lies in the court's mistaken impression that deciding when
human life begins is dispositive of when an entity should be
granted legal status. Assuming the accuracy of Dr. Lejeune's tes-
timony, it merely proves that a unique human life begins to de-
velop shortly after fertilization. This medical conclusion does not,
in and of itself, provide a framework for deciding what this devel-
oping entity's legal status should be. To make such a determina-
tion, one must examine more than biological data. Consideration
must be given to how the law treats embryonic human life-forms.
Judge Young neglected to take this important step.
The still prevailing legal view, expressed by the Supreme
130. Id. at 27.
131. See id. at 81-82 (discussing the uniqueness of the DNA "instructions" con-
tained in the original fertilized egg even before it splits into multiple cells).
132. Id. at 80.
133. Id. at 30.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 37.
136. Id.
1991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Court of the United States in Roe v Wade,'37 is that the word
"person" as used in the Constitution has no prenatal applica-
tion. 138 This means that fetuses, and a fortiori preembryos, are not
persons under the fourteenth amendment and are not entitled to
equal protection or due process guarantees. 39 In Webster v Re-
productive Health Services, 4° Justice Stevens observed that "[n]o
Member of this Court has ever questioned the holding in Roe
that a fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 4 '
A sampling of state laws also indicates broad support for the
position that preembryos are not legal persons. Most states do not
impose criminal sanctions for the destruction of preembryos, nor
are doctors generally required to implant all the fertilized eggs of
IVF participants. 42 Use of intrauterine birth control devices,
which destroy preembryos at the same stage of development as
those cryopreserved for IVF,143 is legal.14 4 These examples demon-
strate that states recognize that a preembryo is not a "person."
3. The Davis Appellate Court Approach
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Davis appellate
court focused on identifying the legal status of preembryos rather
than determining when human life begins. 45 The court noted that
Tennessee had statutorily adopted the trimester approach outlined
in Roe v Wade,146 which "indicates that as embryos develop, they
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
138. Id. at 157-58; see Andrews, supra note 84, at 368 (detailing the Supreme
Court's rejection of any prenatal application of the word "person" in the Constitution).
139. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (declining to categorize a fetus as a "person," as that
term is used within the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment).
140. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
141. Id. at 3083 n.13.
142. Defendant's Brief, supra note 58, at 13. But see supra text accompanying note
102-03.
143. See F CUNNINGHAM, P MACDONALD, & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRIcs 931
(18th ed. 1989) (this device's most prominent contraceptive action is its "[i]nterference
with successful implantation of the fertilized ovum in the endometrium").
144. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3081 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting
that the intrauterine device is a commonly used form of contraception).
145. See Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS at 7 (Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990) (finding that embryos "are not given legal status equivalent to that of a person" in
accordance with federal constitutional law under Roe, Tennessee Statutory law, and Ten-
nessee common law).
146. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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are accorded more respect than mere human cells because of their
burgeoning potential for life. But, even after viability, they are not
given legal status equivalent to that of a person already born.' 47
Furthermore, the appellate court noted that, in cases interpreting
the state wrongful death statute, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that even a viable fetus is not a person unless born alive.148
Because the appellate court properly focused on the rights ac-
corded to preembryos instead of on when life begins, it reversed
the trial court and remanded with instructions to vest "Mary Sue
and Junior with joint control of the fertilized ova and with equal
voice over their disposition."'
49
C. The Special Status of the Preembryo
In deciding the status of the preembryo, the Davis trial judge
restricted his inquiry to a determination of whether the preem-
bryos were persons or property On appeal, the court instead
seemed to adopt the position taken by most American scholars in
the field and by national commissions on IVF worldwide: 50 that
the preembryos have a separate, special status.' 5'
This third view holds that because preembryos are living,
human entities and have the potential to become human beings,
they deserve moral recognition and special respect.' 52 As such,
preembryos should be treated differently than other human tissue
but should not be granted the legal rights accorded to persons. 53
The special status view allows for flexibility in choosing what
measures are appropriate to reflect this respect in the treatment of
preembryos. Some sources suggest placing limits on the ability to
destroy preembryos, while others find such restrictions
unnecessary 1'4
147. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS at 7.
148. Id. (citing Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977); Durrett v.
Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv.,
210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d
221 (1958)).
149. Id. at 9.
150. See generally Robertson, supra note 2, at 972-74 (discussing the gradual adop-
tion of the "special status" view by various ethical and legal groups).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61; see also Comment, Protecting the
Cryopreserved Embryo, 57 TENN. L. REv. 507, 531-36 (1990) (discussing the value of
adopting a middle ground approach for protecting human embryos).
152. Robertson, supra note 2, at 972.
153. Id.
154. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 112, at
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This distinct view of the preembryo was first articulated in
the United States by the Ethics Advisory Board ("EAB"),155 a
committee established by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare in response to the first request for IVF research
funding.1 56 Charged with the task of evaluating the ethical aspects
of IVF, the EAB stated in its 1979 report that "the human em-
bryo is entitled to profound respect, but this respect does not nec-
essarily encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed to
persons."' 57 In 1984 the British Warnock Committee took the
same position, followed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission
in 1985.158 One year later, the "special status" view was also
adopted by the AFS Ethics Committee. 59 The AFS stated that
this special status view "imposes the traditional duty of reasonable
prenatal care when actions risk harm to prospective offspring."' 60
Less clear to the AFS was under what circumstances preembryos
could be discarded or used for research. 16 '
Both moral and legal conceptions of what kinds of beings de-
serve legal rights support granting special status to preembryos.
Moral philosophy holds that "[fior something to count as law
it must have some connection with what can be morally justified,
or it will be indistinguishable from a mere exercise of power.' 6 2
Ronald Dworkin contends that where difficult legal questions are
posed, "judicial decisions must reach beyond legal rules already in
30S-31S (identifying an emerging consensus that preembryos deserve special respect but
finding a divergence of views on whether preembryos may be discarded). For example,
John Robertson maintains that a law prohibiting destruction of preembryos requires very
strong justification because it would impose mandatory preembryo donation and unwanted
biological offspring on IVF participants who cannot use all their preembryos. Robertson,
supra note 2, at 981. Robertson believes this would be too "heavy [a] price to pay for a
symbolic statement of commitment to human life generally." Id.
155. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 112, at
30S ("[T]he human embryo is entitled to profound respect, but this respect does not
necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed to persons.")
156. For an explanation of the federal government's role in regulating IVF, see A.
BONNICKSEN, supra note 21, at 77-79.
157. HEW Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033 (1979). In determining its position on the ethical aspects of
IVF, the EAB "gathered oral testimony from 179 people, written testimony from eighteen
others, and 2,000 items from interest groups and other citizens." A. BONNICKSEN, supra
note 21, at 78-79.
158. Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 112, at 30S.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. V HELD, RIGHTS AND GOODS: JUSTIFYING SOCIAL ACTION 118 (1984).
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place to certain moral principles." '63
The moral basis for the special status position lies in the body
of philosophical thought that distinguishes between "human bio-
logical and human personal life.' 61 4 While biological life is the
period during which cellular human life exists, regardless of con-
scious functioning, personal life encompasses only a human's total
conscious experience.6 5 Personal life is necessarily a subset of bio-
logical life, since a prenatal entity is biologically alive before it is
conscious. While both aspects of life have significance, only one's
personal life is relevant in determining when a human being ex-
ists. 66 This is because rationality, or conscious thought, is the
overriding characteristic that constitutes the essence of humanness
and distinguishes the species from all other beings.'6 7 Just as
163. Id. at 119; see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1978) (dis-
cussing how judges deciding "hard cases" must identify preexisting, objective rights of par-
ties despite the absence of applicable legal rules).
164. Engelhardt, Medicine and the Concept of Person, in WHAT IS A PERSON? 169,
171 (M. Goodman ed. 1988) ("Not all instances of human biological life are instances of
human personal life. Brain dead (but otherwise alive) human beings, human gametes, cells
in human cell cultures, all count as instances of human biological life.")
165. See Puccetti, The Life of a Person, in WHAT IS A PERSON?, supra note 164, at
265, 265. Puccetti states:
When one reflects on the life of a person, it becomes immediately apparent
that this can be done in two very different ways. One way is to look upon the
person as a particular organism with a spatio-temporal history of its own; there
the identity question is approached from the outside, so to speak, and differs not
at all from questions about the identity of material objects through time. The
other way is to look upon the person's life history as the total span of conscious
experience that this person has had; here identity is approached from the inside,
whether it be your own life you are reflecting on, or that of another person. It
was Lucretius' contention, in Book III of De Rerum Natura, that since good or
harm can accrue only to a subject of conscious experiences, the latter is the
correct view and the former leads to superstition.
Id.
166. See id. at 267 (stating that it is vain to "extend personhood" either "beyond the
loss of capacity for conscious experience" or before such capacity exists); see also Engel-
hardt, supra note 164, at 172:
Insofar as we identify persons with moral agents, we exclude from the range of
the concept person those entities which are not self-conscious. Which is to say,
only those beings are unqualified bearers of rights and duties who can both claim
to be acknowledged as having a dignity beyond a value (i.e., as being ends in
themselves), and can be responsible for their actions.
Id.
167. See Callahan, The "Beginning" of Human Life, in WHAT IS A PERSON?, supra
note 164, at 29, 38:
For the most part, historical efforts to define the nature of man have taken
the form of a search for one overriding characteristic that constitutes man's es-
sence. Boethius' classic definition of a person - 'Persona est substantia individua
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brain-death has come to signify the end of a human being's life
despite ongoing biological functioning, the beginning of a human
being's life must be related to the development of brain function,
rationality, or conscious thought.168
The special status view is most consistent with moral philoso-
phy because it recognizes the difference between personal and bio-
logical life. The preembryo is not accorded the legal rights of a
human being because at the preembryonic stage personal life has
not yet begun. The preembryo is given special status, however, as
a moral recognition of respect for biological life and the potential
it possesses.
In addition, an understanding of the concept of legal rights
supports the special status argument. In order to have legal rights,
a being must be capable of having interests.169 There are two rea-
sons for this:
(1) because a right holder must be capable of being represented
and it is impossible to represent a being that has no interests;
and (2) because a right holder must be capable of being a bene-
ficiary in his own person, and a being without interests is a being
that is incapable of being harmed or benefitted, having no good
or "sake" of its own. Thus, a being without interests has no "be-
half" to act in, and no "sake" to act for.170
Preembryos are quintessentially beings without interests. As the
philosopher Joel Feinberg notes, "[iinterests are compounded out
of desires and aims, both of which presuppose something like be-
rationalis naturae - reflects his work as a translator of Aristotle and, more
broadly, the Greek tradition, which saw in rationality man's essence: man is a
rational animal.
Id. (Boethius's definition translates as "personhood amounts to the individuating substance
of rational nature.").
168. See Brody, On the Humanity of the Fetus, in WHAT IS A PERSON?, supra note
164, at 229, 232:
It is [the existence of electroencephalographic brain waves] which is used in
determining the moment of death, the moment at which the entity in question is
no longer a living human being. So, on the grounds of symmetry, it would seem
appropriate to treat it as the moment at which the entity in question becomes a
living being.
Id. (footnote omitted). Brody further contends that the brain function argument rests
"upon the claim that the fetus becomes a living human being when it acquires that charac-
teristic which is such that its loss entails that a living human being no longer exists." Id. at
248.
169. J. FEINBERO, RIGHTS. JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 167 (1980); see
Robertson, supra note 64, at 445 ("Genetic uniqueness alone proves nothing if the cells in
question lack other characteristics and hence lack interests.").
170. J. FEINBERG, supra note 169, at 167.
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lief or cognitive awareness. 1 1'  Based on this analysis, it has been
argued that legal rights cannot accrue to inanimate objects,
plants, and individuals with severe, irreversible brain damage.17 2
The same holds for preembryos. 17
Therefore, the special status argument is the soundest ap-
proach. It reflects recognition of the argument, expressed by Dr.
Lejeune, that after fertilization there is a human, living entity, a
unique biological life that compels respect. The special status view
also recognizes the primitive state of that entity and the philo-
sophical and legal reasons that legal rights should not be granted
to such early life-forms. For these reasons, the special status view
has the strongest support both nationally and internationally, and
should serve as a guiding principle for state legislatures and
judges in determining the status of the preembryo.
III. THE NATURE OF THE SPOUSES' INTERESTS
One of the main consequences of granting preembryos a spe-
cial status is that resolution of the spouses' dispute is still left in
question. It is clear that neither custody laws nor property distri-
bution statutes are implicated under the special status view, but it
is not clear what alternative approach should be adopted. To make
this determination, the focus of the inquiry must shift to the na-
ture of each spouse's rights, and the appropriate balance between
them.
The first consideration in this area is whether either the hus-
band or the wife has a fundamental constitutional right to procre-
ate or to avoid procreation. If so, that spouse could challenge any
unfavorable judicial decision or state law on constitutional
grounds. If not, other methods for choosing between the spouses'
interests must be explored.
171. Id. at 168 (emphasis omitted).
172. See id. at 160, 167-71, 176-77 (discussing the lack of legal rights accruing to
rocks, plants, and humans in a persistent vegetative state).
173. Feinberg suggests that fetuses may be entitled to legal rights under the princi-
ple stated by Lord Coke: "The law in many cases hath consideration of him in respect of
the apparent expectation of his birth." Id. at 179. However, Feinberg contends that there is
a limit to granting rights to a being by virtue of its potential interests. There is a distinction
between direct or proximate potentialities and those that are indirect or remote. Only enti-
ties with proximate potentialities are entitled to have their potential interests protected.
Feinberg acknowledges that there may be borderline cases where classification will be un-
certain or arbitrary. Id. at 183.
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A. Constitutional Arguments
1. In Favor of Implantation
A woman in Mary Sue Davis's position might argue that she
has a constitutionally protected right to procreate, which encom-
passes the right to have the preembryos implanted. Because such
a right would be considered fundamental, it could be overridden
only by a compelling state interest. 17 4 It is important to note that
Mary Sue Davis would assert a positive right to bear children, as
distinct from the right to avoid bearing children protected in cases
such as Roe v Wade 17 5 and Planned Parenthood v Danforth.'7
To determine whether Mary Sue Davis possesses such a right, it is
necessary to examine the extent to which the Supreme Court has
protected procreative rights.
The only Supreme Court case to explicitly recognize a funda-
mental right to procreate is Skinner v Oklahoma. '77 The Skinner
Court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute that permitted
sterilization of individuals convicted of two or more felonies in-
volving moral turpitude. The basis of this ruling was the Court's
determination that marriage and procreation are basic human
rights.17'
The court implicitly recognized a fundamental right to pro-
create in dicta from two other cases. In Meyer v Nebraska, 9 the
Court held that constitutional liberties include one's right "to
marry, establish a home and bring up children." 80 In Eisenstadt
v Baird,' 8  Justice Brennan stated, "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
174. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Supreme Court established
that certain rights are so basic and important that they deserve special judicial protection.
State action that infringes on these fundamental rights would come under strict scrutiny by
the Court and would be upheld only if narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest. Id. at 541. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the
Court recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right and applied a strict scrutiny
standard of review. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 14.26-.27 (1986) (tracing the development of a constitutionally protected right to
privacy in sexual matters).
175. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
176. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
177. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
178. Id. at 541.
179. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
180. Id. at 399.
181. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child." '82
These three cases can be read to support Mary Sue Davis's
asserted constitutional right to have the preembryos implanted, as
this decision is clearly a decision to bear a child. For several rea-
sons, however, past precedents have not guaranteed procreative
rights in this context.
First, the Supreme Court has never addressed the applicabil-
ity of the right to procreate when conception takes place by artifi-
cial means. Several legal scholars have presented strong argu-
ments for extending the right to cover noncoital conception, 183 but
the growth of reproductive technologies poses issues that the Su-
preme Court could not have anticipated and cannot fairly be said
to have considered. 8 State courts that have addressed the consti-
tutional issues surrounding artificial insemination have failed to
offer clear guidance.18 5 To recognize fundamental rights in these
cases would require a significant extension of current constitu-
tional protections.
182. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
183. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 84, at 359 (stating that "[i]t is not the coitus
itself that this right to privacy protects but rather the fundamental nature and importance
of having a child" (footnotes omitted)); Robertson, supra note 2, at 961 ("the reasons and
values that support a right to reproduce coitally apply equally to noncoital activities involv-
ing external conception and collaborators"). But cf. Note, The Use of In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion: Is There a Right to Bear or Beget a Child by any Available Medical Means? 12
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1033, 1045-46 (1985) (Court decisions could be interpreted to protect
only natural reproduction carried out privately, without outside assistance).
184. See Note, supra note 183, at 1041:
It is by no means clear that Skinner should be read so broadly as to encom-
pass access to a medical procedure as an alternative to intercourse. The logic of
Skinner, that justified protecting a man from sterilization, does not easily extend
to justify protecting an infertile couple's use of a medical procedure at the same
level. Further justification is required.
Id.
185. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987).
The Baby M trial court "reasoned that if one has the right to procreate coitally, then one
has the right to reproduce noncoitally. If it is the reproduction that is protected, then the
means of reproduction are also to be protected." Id. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1164. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision on the grounds that the surrogacy
contract conflicted with public policy and existing adoption legislation. In re Baby M, 109
N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
In another surrogate motherhood case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reasoned that
impregnating a surrogate mother "is not biologically different from the reverse situation
where the husband is infertile and the wife conceives by artificial insemination." Surrogate
Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). The
court held that parental rights are the same regardless of the existence of a surrogacy
contract but did not identify a constitutional basis for these rights. Id. at 213.
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Second, the Court has generally limited its protection of the
right to procreate to situations involving married couples. 18 6 State
laws forbidding fornication and other sexual acts between unmar-
ried persons have been found constitutional.1 8 7 While the Court in
Eisenstadt v Baird88 extended the right to privacy to childbear-
ing decisions by both married and unmarried persons, its analysis
focused on contraception and therefore dealt with the right to
avoid childbearing, rather than the right to procreate. While the
Court has extended contraception and abortion rights to unmar-
ried women, 1 9 it was motivated by a desire to protect against un-
wanted pregnancies, unwed motherhood, and venereal disease. 90
The Court did not intend to create a general right to sexual pri-
vacy and procreation for unmarried persons. 191 Therefore, a wo-
man in Mary Sue Davis's position may be unsuccessful in assert-
ing a constitutional right to procreate. 192
Last, the Supreme Court has never extended support for a
right to bear a specific child; only a general right to maintain pro-
creative function and make family-related decisions has been rec-
186. See Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 415 (1983) ("When [Supreme Court] opinions men-
tion procreation, they usually presuppose procreation within a marriage or a traditional
family and assume that the conception and bearing of children will occur in a natural
way.")
187. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 174, at 711 (summariz-
ing cases in which state "lifestyle" statutes have passed constitutional scrutiny).
188. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
189. See. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(Court's holding must protect the abortion decision equally for married and unmarried
women); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (extending the right to use contraception to unmarried
individuals under equal protection).
190. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Pri-
vacy - Balancing the Individual and Societal Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 537
(1983) (emphasizing the Court-recognized need to protect teenagers from unwanted
pregnancies).
191. See id. at 527-38 (observing that in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977), several Justices stated that they did not intend for the case to establish a
constitutional right of sexual privacy for unmarried minors, and that in Roe, the Court
rejected a broad right of individual autonomy allowing one "to do with one's body as one
pleases"). But cf. Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Un-
married, 98 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1985) (arguing that the Court should extend procreative
rights to unmarried persons).
192. Mary Sue Davis remarried shortly after her divorce. Davis v. Davis, No. 180,
1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at 1 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990). This eliminated any problem
with her being unmarried. It is likely, however, that many women will not be married at
the time they assert the right to implantation. Moreover, the right to procreate within
marriage, as previously affirmed by the Supreme Court, may not extend to include procrea-
tion with prior spouses.
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ognized. 93 Therefore, Mary Sue Davis ould not argue that con-
stitutional precedents support a right to implant any of the
contested preembryos in particular.
It is clear that under existing constitutional doctrine a woman
does not have a right to implant preembryos. Recognizing such a
right would require extensions of several aspects of the right to
sexual privacy - which does not seem likely in light of the
Court's recent privacy jurisprudence.194
2. Against Implantation
It is also likely that Junior Davis could not rely on constitu-
tional arguments, despite the Davis appellate court's recognition
of a fundamental right in this case. He might argue that Roe v.
Wade' 95 establishes a fundamental right to prevent the birth of an
unwanted child and that a man should be allowed to exercise this
right in the IVF setting because assertion of this right would not
force upon a woman the physical burden of undergoing an abor-
tion. A close look at the reasoning behind Roe, however, suggests
that its logic would not extend to the IVF context.
Underlying the Court's determination in Roe to protect the
decision to terminate a pregnancy is a desire to avoid imposing
significant gestational and childrearing burdens.1 96 The Court spe-
cifically mentioned the medical risks associated with pregnancy,
the mental and physical burden of child care, the stigma of unwed
motherhood, and the psychological harm to the mother as reasons
for its decision.' 97 Since these burdens all fell on the pregnant wo-
man, the Court gave the woman the right to avoid these burdens
through abortion.
Junior Davis can not claim that he would suffer these same
burdens. He would not be physically impaired by either the preg-
nancy or birth. He would not likely be forced to personally raise
the child. He may not even be required to support the child finan-
cially 198 The only harm that could reasonably be expected is the
193. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing the fun-
damental nature of marital and procreative rights under the equal protection clause of the
Constitution).
194. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend
right to privacy to include protection of consensual homosexual acts).
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. Id. at 153.
197. Id.
198. By analogy, there is some precedent for releasing the father from legal responsi-
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psychological burden of knowing an unwanted, biologically related
child has been born, assuming a successful IVF process. While
this kind of harm could be significant, the Court's decision in Roe
does not indicate that this would be sufficient to trigger strict
scrutiny analysis associated with a fundamental right. There is no
suggestion in Roe that the Court intended to establish a right to
prevent the birth of an unwanted child in any context other than a
woman's right to an abortion.
In fact, Junior Davis might find the best indication of how
the Supreme Court would treat his asserted right in Planned
Parenthood v Danforth.199 In Danforth, the Court struck down a
Missouri statute requiring spousal consent for an abortion, reason-
ing that since the state cannot regulate abortions during the first
trimester of pregnancy, it cannot delegate to a spouse the power to
do so.200 This demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to recognize
in the husband a fundamental right to participate in the decision
of whether his child will be born.20 1
Despite Danforth, the Davis appellate court recognized Jun-
ior Davis's right not to beget a child where no pregnancy had oc-
curred. The Davis court's sole support was the Supreme Court's
statement that "'[t]he decision whether to bear or beget a child is
a constitutionally protected choice.' ",202 In Schochet v State,03
bility for a child in such a case. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), the Supreme Court narrowly construed the responsibilities
of absent fathers to their illegitimate children, despite the genetic tie. Also, several states
have laws providing that sperm donors do not have financial obligations to their genetic
children. See Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Paren-
tal Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W RES. L. REV. 1, 90-91 (1990).
Seventeen states have adopted a uniform act providing that "[t]he donor of semen is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287, § 5(b) (1973). Other states have enacted statutes that
"generally adopt the [Uniform Parentage] Act's basic pattern." Wagner, supra at 91. But
cf. Robertson, supra note 64, at 477 (suggesting that since a sperm donor engages in a
transaction making offspring possible, the traditional rule of imposing legal responsibility
on the father may be justified).
199. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
200. See id. at 69 (recognizing "the deep and proper concern and interest that a
devoted and protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and develop-
ment of the fetus she is carrying" but refusing to recognize that the husband has a funda-
mental right in this context).
201. Justice Stevens suggested, in a concurring opinion, that the Court erred by not
addressing the issue of men's rights in a more substantial way. Id. at 90.
202. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS at 5 (Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990) (quoting, with immaterial errors, Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977), and citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. 1990)).
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however, the Maryland Court of Appeals stressed the importance
of applying this statement cautiously,20 4 noting the dangerous ten-
dency of courts to apply the words out of context.205 Application
of this precept has been limited to the contexts of contraception
and abortion.2 0 6 The recognition by the Davis appellate court of
Junior Davis's right not to beget a child thus rests on unstable
ground and is probably improper in view of Danforth.0 7
Although both spouses may seek to preserve interests that
share characteristics with rights previously upheld by the Supreme
Court, neither spouse can safely rely on a constitutional argument
in this case. While there may be procreative rights involved, they
are not fundamental. Thus, judges and legislatures are free to re-
solve this conflict in any manner rationally related to a legitimate
state objective. 20 8
B. Suggested Approaches
The best approach to disputes over the disposition of frozen
preembryos remains to be determined. Scholars in the field of
medical ethics have offered several ideas. Some wrote articles at a
time when this kind of conflict could only be imagined,20 9 while
others have written recently, specifically in response to the Davis
controversy 210
203. 75 Md. App. 314, 541 A.2d 183 (1988).
204. Id. at 328, 541 A.2d at 190.
205. Id. at 331, 541 A.2d at 191.
206. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977):
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child holds a particularly
important place in the history of the right to privacy, a right first explicitly rec-
ognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives and most prominently vindicated in recent years in the con-
texts of contraception and abortion
Id. (citations omitted).
207. See 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 199-201).
The Davis appellate court did not consider Danforth in its opinion.
208. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 174, at 530
(discussing the rational basis test).
209. See, e.g., Note, Embryo Transplant, Parental Conflict, and Reproductive Free-
dom: A Prospective Analysis of Issues and Arguments Created by Forthcoming Technol-
ogy, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 609, 610-11 (1987) (analyzing treatment of the hypothetical
situation where the father favors transfer and implantation of a preembryo against the
woman's wishes).
210. See, e.g., Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos. HASTINGS
CENTER REP.. Nov./Dec. 1989, at 7 (1989) (discussing methods to promote orderly disposi-
tion of frozen embryos); Robertson, supra note 64, at 473-75 (discussing the Davis case as
an example of the difficulties that may arise when couples give no advance instructions as
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Most scholars agree that any rule that might apply would be
a default rule, operating only when the spouses have neglected to
specify a means of resolution at the outset.2 11 Any such rule must
resolve these disputes fairly and consistently, and should apply
equally whether it is the husband or the wife who objects to im-
plantation. Two possible rules that could effectively govern the
outcome of these kinds of cases are presented and evaluated
below
1. The Double Consent Rule
One approach would be to require mutual spousal consent as
a prerequisite to implantation of all preembryos created through
IVF This approach would require obtaining consent twice from
each spouse - once when the IVF procedure is initiated and
again before each implantation. In the event that one spouse ref-
uses to consent at the implantation stage, the preembryos would
be automatically discarded or, at the spouses' mutual choice,
donated to another couple. In the event of the death of one spouse,
the other could proceed with implantation absent a specified
agreement otherwise.
There are several advantages to adopting such a rule. It takes
into account the period of delay that may occur between attempts
at implantation by ensuring that both spouses continue to support
the important decision to have a child. Such a rule would apply
equally to both spouses in protecting them from becoming parents
against their will. In addition, this approach would promote con-
sistency in the treatment of these disputes and would prevent the
kind of litigation sparked in the Davis case.
This rule would also have disadvantages, however. Most sig-
nificantly, it would grant tremendous power to one spouse over the
other. It would mean that even though both spouses initially con-
sented to having a child through IVF, neither could proceed with
certainty that the other would not truncate the process. Such an
outcome would surely frustrate the spouse seeking implantation,
who will have invested large financial expense,212 time, energy,
to frozen embryo disposition).
211. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 210, at 12 (recommending that any legal rule
adopted take effect only if couples fail to resolve the dispute independently). See generally
Robertson, supra note 64, at 473 (discussing the problems arising from the absence of pre-
negotiated disposition agreements).
212. A 1988 survey of 146 IVF clinics in the United States indicated that the aver-
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and, in the wife's case, physical pain. The required second consent
for implantation could become a tool for manipulation and abuse
between spouses, especially under circumstances of a pending di-
vorce. Any spouse ultimately denied the chance to have a child
through IVF would probably suffer considerable emotional stress.
2. The Implantation Rule
A second approach would allow implantation if both spouses
initially consent to IVF, even where one spouse later objects, so
long as the spouse that wants to continue the process accepts sole
legal responsibility for any resulting children. Under this rule, a
spouse who initially consents to IVF would have no power to inter-
rupt the process later on.
Under this approach, disputes will entail one of two conse-
quences. When the husband objects to implantation, this rule
would allow the wife to prevail but would absolve the husband
from all legal responsibility for any resulting children. It would
also strip the husband of all parental rights with respect to the
children. When the wife objects to implantation, this rule would
allow the husband to have the preembryos implanted in another
woman. Here, the genetic mother would be deprived of parental
rights and absolved of all legal responsibility This second scenario
might occur if the husband becomes sterile in the period following
the creation of the preembryos, and their implantation becomes
his only opportunity to father a biologically related child.
213
There are three advantages to this approach. First, it would
encourage very careful deliberation by spouses considering IVF;
they would know at the outset that they are making a commit-
ment to a process that neither spouse alone could interrupt. Such
careful consideration would likely reduce the number of subse-
quent disputes. Second, this rule would guarantee the opportunity
to follow the IVF process through to completion to those spouses
who invest their time, money, and hope in this process. Third, this
rule would offer consistency in the treatment of such disputes and
prevent litigation in this area.
There is one significant disadvantage to this approach. The
age cost of one 1VF procedure ranges from $4,000 to $7,000. In Vitro Hearings, supra note
20, at 316-1300 (full text of subcommittee's report).
213. See also supra note 10 (after remarriage to a new wife who can not bear chil-
dren, the husband in Davis is seeking custody of the embryos for implantation in a surro-
gate mother).
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implantation rule could result in a child being born against the
wishes of one of its genetic parents. While the child's birth would
not force legal or financial responsibility upon the unwilling par-
ent, it might cause psychological harm to both the parent and the
child.
3. Determining the Better Rule
In choosing between these two rules, two factors must be con-
sidered: fairness to the parties and minimizing harm to the losing
party 214 These factors are independent. For example, the rule
that most fairly decides which spouse will prevail may also be the
rule that causes the losing spouse to incur the most legal, emo-
tional, and financial harm. An evaluation of these two factors,
however, demonstrates that the implantation rule is preferable on
both counts.
Fairness considerations require a determination of whether it
would be more equitable to allow the spouse who wants to prevent
the possibility of a birth to prevail, or instead to allow the spouse
who wants to continue the process of procreation to prevail. One
fact is of vital importance in making this judgment: the spouse
who opposes implantation wanted a child at one time and submit-
ted to the IVF process with that end in mind. The two spouses
once agreed on this issue and initiated the IVF procedure in reli-
ance on that mutual wish. Given this background, the greater in-
justice would be to deny implantation to the spouse who detrimen-
tally relied on the other's words and conduct.
Protection against this sort of injustice is recognized by the
well-established doctrine of estoppel. The doctrine of estoppel
states: "As a general rule, where a person has, with knowledge of
the facts, acted or conducted himself in a particular manner
he cannot afterward assume a position inconsistent therewith to
the prejudice of one who has acted in reliance on such conduct
",215 There are two requirements for the application of estop-
pel: "the party against whom the estoppel is claimed must have
done some act or pursued some course of conduct with knowledge
214. See generally J. GLOVER, ETHICS OF NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES -
THE GLOVER REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 24-31 (1989) (discussing the utilita-
rian approach, which focuses on each party's gains and losses, and the dignity approach,
which focuses on the respect with which each party should be treated, to resolving conflicts
arising from the use of reproductive technologies).
215. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 108(a) (1964).
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of the facts and of his rights, and, in addition, it is essential that
the party claiming the estoppel should have been misled to his
prejudice. ' 216 When these requirements are met, the doctrine of
estoppel prevents the estopped party from acting other than in ac-
cordance with the expectations of the other party The underlying
goal of the rule is to protect "those who have been misled by that
which on its face was fair." 217
The elements of estoppel are satisfied in a dispute such as
Davis. The knowing action of the objecting spouse is the under-
taking of IVF for the purpose of producing a child. The prejudice
to the other spouse consists of the time, money, and psychological
commitment necessarily expended' in pursuing the full procedure.
The injury would include not only the time and money spent, but
also the lost opportunity to have a child.
The law of estoppel serves as a guideline in deciding whether
the implantation rule or the double consent rule is more fair. The
estoppel doctrine indicates that the unfairness to the objecting
spouse is outweighed by the unfairness to the spouse who wants to
complete the IVF process. As stated in an amicus curiae brief
filed in the Davis case:
At the time the plaintiff donated, gave, offered, furnished and
delivered his sperm to the Fertility Center (albeit artificially
[sic]) he gave up control of his reproductive function just as
he would [have] if he deposited the sperm naturally in his wife,
and he should be estopped from asserting any legal rights
thereto.21 8
The doctrine of estoppel would prevent the spouse opposing im-
plantation from frustrating the other spouse's desire to complete
the IVF process. This result is reached only through the implanta-
tion rule. The double consent rule does not estop the opposing
spouse from withdrawing consent. Thus, the implantation rule is
the fairer rule.
The second consideration in choosing between the implanta-
tion and double consent rules is the extent of the harm posed by
each rule. This factor has been analyzed by Professor John Rob-
216. Id. § 108(b).
217. Id. § i(a).
218. Brief of Amicus Curiae, R.D. Hash, at 3, Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989
LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev d, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 1990).
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ertson in the context of the Davis case.2 19 Robertson maintains
that the harm of losing would be much greater for Junior Davis
because he would bear a lifelong psychological and legal burden,
while Mary Sue Davis would only have to find another means of
having a child if she lost. 220
Robertson's analysis, however, overlooks several important
considerations. First, the spouse opposing implantation would not
necessarily bear legal responsibility for any resulting children. The
implantation rule proposed here recognizes that imposing contin-
ued legal responsibility on the objecting spouse would be unfair
and exempts the objecting spouse from traditional rules requiring
such responsibility 221 Second, there may be no psychological bur-
den placed on the objecting spouse. It is possible that, like scores
of sperm donors, the spouse could live undisturbed despite the ex-
istence of genetic offspring. It is also possible that the objecting
spouse would want to develop a positive relationship with any re-
sulting child. In such a case, the spouse could choose to shoulder
full legal responsibility for the child, thus acquiring full parental
rights. This might have been the result in the Davis case if im-
plantation had occurred, since Junior Davis expressed 'a desire to
provide financial support and secure visiting rights if a child were
born from the preembryos 22
The third problem with the Robertson analysis is its under-
valuation of the cost of losing for the spouse favoring implanta-
tion. Robertson states that this spouse need merely find another
means of having a child. Finding an alternative means, however,
might pose significant difficulties, especially for the wife. A wo-
man left in this situation would have to start the IVF process all
over again. This would entail spending at least another $5,000 to
$7,000, undergoing fertility drug therapy and, perhaps, surgery
Unless she remarries, the wife will likely be precluded from IVF,
219. See Robertson, supra note 210, at 7; Robertson, supra note 64, at 477-81 (dis-
cussing the types of harm arising from the imposition of involuntary parenthood, including
the financial and psychological burdens of unwanted reproduction and the burden of seek-
ing alternative means of producing biological offspring).
220. Robertson, supra note 68, at 8. Robertson notes elsewhere, however, that if the
spouse seeking implantation becomes biologically incapable of reproducing, "the equities
tip in favor of [that spouse] because the pleasures of parenthood [are] deeper and
more intense than the discomfort of unwanted biologic offspring." Robertson, supra note
64, at 481.
221. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
222. Curriden, supra note 46, at 70.
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since most clinics presently restrict IVF to married couples.2 3
Even assuming that the wife could obtain IVF treatment, the de-
lay might affect her fertility, further decreasing her chances of
having a child. Robertson's analysis ignores the frustration and
despair a woman is likely to suffer under these circumstances. For
the wife in particular, Robertson undervalues the cost of finding
an alternative means of having a child.
The conclusion from this harm analysis is that the potential
harm to the objecting spouse is not nearly as great as the harm
facing the spouse who wants to complete the IVF process. While
the first spouse's harm amounts to a possibility of psychological
discomfort, the second spouse would incur that same discomfort
along with the very real financial, physical, and emotional burdens
of starting over again, possibly with a lower chance of success. In
the interest of reducing the total harm to both spouses, the im-
plantation rule is clearly the better choice.
C. Accounting for the Preembryo's Special Status
The special status granted to preembryos is grounded in re-
spect for their potential and thus supports the implantation rule.
Protection of the potential life of a fetus is an issue that has arisen
in several abortion cases considered by the Supreme Court. In
Roe v Wade,224 the Court recognized a state's "important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life," 225
though holding the state's interest compelling only at the point of
fetal viability 226 In two more recent abortion cases, Justice
O'Connor insisted that the state's interest in protecting the poten-
tiality of human life exists throughout pregnancy 22 7 The Court's
belief that society's interest in preserving potential life is strong
enough to affect treatment of prenatal entities is shared to a cer-
tain degree by those who claim preembryos have a special status.
The special status view does not assert that preserving poten-
tial life is so important that preembryos should be implanted
whenever eggs are fertilized extracorporeally This result would be
223. AMERICAN FERTILITY SOC'Y, INVESTIGATION OF THE INFERTILE COUPLE 45
(1986), reprinted in In Vitro Hearings, supra note 20, at 71.
224. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
225. Id. at 162.
226. Id. at 164-65.
227. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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too harsh, forcing IVF participants to implant more preembryos
than they desire and probably more than a woman can physically
bear. The alternative of donating any "extra" preembryos to
anonymous recipients would equally undermine the control of IVF
participants over their genetic material.
Rather, the special status of preembryos argues for implanta-
tion of preembryos when at least one spouse favors that choice.
When one spouse wishes to further the preembryo's development
and the other wishes for its destruction, the choice should be to
protect the preembryo's human life potentiality As one medical
ethicist stated, in a discussion of the Davis case, "What makes an
embryo valuable is its potential to develop to become a member of
the human community The wife in this case wants to have that
value upheld, and in that, I think she has values that we could
endorse for society "28
Therefore, in a spousal dispute over the disposition of preem-
bryos, where fairness, harm, and the preembryo's status are all
considered, the preference for implantation is compelling. The im-
plantation rule set forth above229 affords respect for the spouses'
interests as well as the preembryos at the center of the dispute.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, every married couple would have the ability to bear a
child by natural means, and every decision to have a child would
be supported by both spouses. However, the courts must establish
law to resolve cases where neither of these ideals obtain. When
couples have no choice but to rely on IVF for childbearing and
when one spouse changes his or her mind about the procedure af-
ter it has begun, the disputes that arise demand legal analysis of
issues with little precedent. Established legal principles must be
employed to resolve these modern conflicts appropriately
One such principle is that early life-forms have a special sta-
tus that requires moral, but not legal, recognition. Applying this
principle to the present case indicates that preembryos have no
legal entitlement to implantation. The special respect they should
be accorded may suggest, however, that in the balance between
the spouses' rights, the spouse favoring implantation has a greater
228. K. Nolan, M.D., The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, LEXIS/NEXIS Macleh file,
transcript no. 3531, at screen 23 (PBS television broadcast, Aug. 7, 1989).
229. See supra section III.B.2 of this text.
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interest.
Another such principle is the doctrine of estoppel. Applying
estoppel to the facts of a controversy such as Davis also supports
the spouse who favors implantation. Detrimental reliance in this
context is perhaps more deserving of recognition than in any
other. Therefore, the implantation rule, allowing the spouse who
wants to implant the preembryos to prevail conditioned on that
spouse's acceptance of sole legal responsibility for any resulting
child, offers the best solution.
A final such principle is that legal rules should minimize the
total harm to disputants. Applying this principle to spouses who
are in dispute over the disposition of their frozen preembryos, the
better rule would be to allow implantation. Allowing implantation
harms the unwilling spouse less than disallowing implantation
would harm the willing spouse.
The implantation rule should be implemented in the near fu-
ture, so that IVF participants will be better protected from the
vacillation of their spouses than they are at present. This rule will
force spouses who are unsure about having a child to think more
carefully before beginning the IVF process. Those individuals who
ultimately pursue IVF will be secure in the knowledge that only
medical impossibility, not the law, will prevent them from having
the children they desire.
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